I don’t usually feel that New York Times headlines represent my feelings on an issue, but when I do, they’re written by the right-wing radical anti-Semite Max Fisher.

Truly, no one does know.

And it is so confusing that it almost has induced a form of insanity in a lot of people who have genuinely tried to figure it out.

A day after the assassination, I wrote an article entitled “I Don’t Even Know What is Going On, lol.” I feel the same way today, but worse.

Not having a war doesn’t seem to be the strategy – you don’t really assassinate a country’s number two official if you’re not trying to start a war with them – but nothing is in place for having a war. And short of a draft, no one can explain where the manpower would come from.

“Mad” Max Fisher expresses our collective societal confusion on this issue for the New York Times:

When the United States announced on Friday that it had killed Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, something about its explanation left many analysts puzzled.

The strike was intended to deter further Iranian attacks, administration officials said. But they also said it was also expected to provoke severe enough attacks by Iran that the Pentagon was deploying an additional several thousand troops to the region.

The apparent contradiction left many experts wondering about the strike’s intended goal, and the strategy behind it.

The next day did little to settle the matter. The strike had been intended to prevent an imminent Iranian attack, officials said publicly. Or to change the behavior of Iran’s surviving leaders. Or to cow those leaders, whose behavior would never change.

Others said privately that President Trump had ordered it in response to television reports of an Iranian-backed siege on the American Embassy compound in Baghdad.

Mr. Suleimani’s killing has left a swirl of confusion among analysts, former policymakers and academics.

And also among right-wing radicals like me and Max Fisher, a vicious Jew hater who is constantly agitating in defense of Hebrew Israelites on Twitter.com.

The United States had initiated a sudden, drastic escalation against a regional power, risking fierce retaliation, or even war.

Why?

“There’s not a single person that I’ve spoken to who can tell you what Trump is up to with Iran,” said Ellie Geranmayeh, an analyst at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

It’s not that experts or foreign officials suspect a secret agenda, but that the administration’s action fit no clear pattern or long-term strategy, she said. “It just doesn’t add up.”

This is the situation I’ve experienced.

I’ve been texting and calling everyone I know who knows anything about anything, and no one understands what’s going on with this situation.

The number one response I’ve gotten from people I’ve asked what they think is going on is as follows: “Uhhhhhhhhhh, well, uhhhhhhhh.”

The killing, many say, deepens the uncertainty that has surrounded Mr. Trump’s ambitions toward Iran since he withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear accord and began a series of provocations that he terms maximum-pressure.

The risk, experts say, is that if they cannot figure out the administration’s goals and priorities for Iran, its red lines and points of possible compromise, then foreign governments won’t be able to either.

“Absolutely not,” Ms. Geranmayeh said when asked whether European or Middle Eastern officials, whom she speaks with regularly, understood Mr. Trump’s strategy. “Not even the closest U.S. allies, like in London.”

It makes me feel better to know that, I guess.

Though I already did know that me and my circle of friends are smarter than global government officials.

This imposes a layer of confusion on the conflict, just as it enters a dangerous and volatile new chapter, inviting mixed messages and misread intentions.

“If it’s that hard for us to understand, imagine the Iranians,” said Dalia Dassa Kaye, who directs a Middle East policy center at RAND Corporation, a nonpartisan research group.

Mixed signals, she said, make any effort to shape an adversary’s behavior “incredibly ineffective.” Uncertainty about Mr. Trump’s intentions also increases risks that the conflict could spiral out of control.

Without a clear understanding of what actions will lead the United States to ramp up or ramp down hostilities, she said, Iranian leaders are operating in the dark — and waiting to stumble past some unseen red line.

“That’s what makes this a dangerous situation,” she said.

…

Trump … has cycled between ambitions of withdrawing from the Middle East, positioning himself as a once-in-a-generation peacemaker and, more recently, promising to oppose Iran more forcefully than any recent president has.

Yeah, the fact that he keeps switching his stated goals back and forth doesn’t make things any easier, I can tell you that much.

He has also been pulled between his advisers, with some urging cautious adherence to the status quo and others arguing for overtly topping Iran’s government.

…

United States diplomacy has emphasized calls for peace but has conspicuously declined to offer what diplomats call “offramps” — easy, low-stakes opportunities for both sides to begin de-escalating, which are considered essential first steps.

“There’s been no talk of, say, ‘If you do this, then we’ll bring back waivers,’” Ms. Kaye said, referring to American waivers allowing other countries to buy Iranian oil. “‘If you do X, then you’ll get Y.’ There’s been nothing tangible like that.”

Throughout months of proxy conflict, American military responses have ranged from muted or nonexistent — as in the case of an attack on Saudi oil facilities that was believed to be the work of Iran — to extreme escalations like killing Mr. Suleimani.

Even if each action might be defensible on its own, experts and foreign officials have strained to match them with a consistent set of motives and objectives.

Suspicions have deepened that there may be no long-term strategy at all, even among those sympathetic to Mr. Trump’s policies.

…

Ms. Geranmayeh stressed that the conflict between the United States and Iran also threatens to draw in a host of Middle Eastern and European countries.

To navigate tensions and avoid worsening them, allies and adversaries alike must astutely judge American intentions and anticipate American actions.

All of them, she said, seemed at a loss.

“Most experts and officials that I’ve spoken to from the Middle East, including close allies — Saudi Arabia, Israel — they also can’t tell you with confidence what Trump wants on Iran,” she said.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had already been ramping down tensions with Iran, Ms. Geranmayeh said, “because they have no idea how Trump will behave from one week to the next” and fear getting caught in the middle.

Similar confusion in Tehran, she added, could become “the biggest problem.”

“If Trump is not managing a consistent and clear message to the Iranians about what he wants,” she said, “then this opens up a lot of space for a lot of miscalculation.”

…

Brett McGurk, who until last year was the administration’s special envoy to the coalition against the Islamic State, warned his former bosses, in an article for Foreign Affairs, that their maximalist demands had left “no plausible on-ramp for Iran to enter negotiations, since nobody, including the Iranians, knows what Iran is supposed to negotiate about.”

Ms. Kaye said Iran might conclude that it should tread with extreme caution. Or it might reason that the United States poses a threat that is both existential and unyielding, compelling Tehran to gamble on taking extreme measures.

“What I’m concerned about is that mixed signals, plus the perception of existential threat,” Ms. Kaye said, “might lead to dramatic steps that we might not have thought possible.”

Yes.

The idea of a literal war with Iran sounds completely impossible.

But when you have this level of escalation, with no clear objective, you have a situation where there almost has to be a war.

And as the Times piece points out – Iran has no idea what is going on, and so might get to the point where they just decide to go all out and start killing Americans across the Middle East and/or in America.

Conversely, the Jews could stage some kind of false flag attack and blame it on Iran and then force a US bombing, that would lead to terrorist-style payback, that would then lead to an invasion.

Max Fisher: This is the creature that wants to rob the British of their independence.

The struggle between nationalists and Jews isn’t just some simple argument that can be won by conventional politics. Our enemies will do whatever they can to get their way. As long as the normal institutions and procedures get them the results they want, they’ll go along with them.

But when the stupid goyim vote wrong, all bets are off.

Max Fisher writes for The New York Times:

In the days since Britons voted to leave the European Union, the so-called “Brexit” referendum has created such severe turmoil that public attention is increasingly focused on an extreme option: Can they get out of it?

Prime Minister David Cameron said on Monday that he considered the referendum binding and that “the process of implementing the decision in the best possible way must now begin.” But he also said he would leave that process to his successor, after his expected resignation in October. This opens a window of at least four months during which time Britain could decide not to proceed, and avoid consequences from Europe.

Look at the way these people think. “Sure, the Goyim voted for Brexit. But maybe we could scheme a little something?” And they say this brazenly, out in the open, publishing this in The New York Times.

Don’t let these manipulative snakes whisper in your ear, white man!

The rat Fisher then enumerates a few scenarios that would allow our enemies to Jew over the Brits out of their hard earned victory.

Option No. 1: Simply don’t do it

The referendum is not legally binding. The process of leaving does not begin until the prime minister officially invokes Article 50 of the European Union’s governing treaty. So he or she could, in theory, carry on as if the vote had never happened.

…

Option No. 2: A Scottish veto

The House of Lords said in an April report that any decision to exit the European Union would have to be approved by the Parliaments of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales.

…

Option No. 3: A do-over

In 1992, Danish voters narrowly rejected a referendum on joining one of the treaties that laid the European Union’s foundations. Eleven months later, after a flurry of diplomacy, Denmark held a second referendum, which voters approved.

…

Option No. 4: An exit in name only

Article 50 gives an exiting country two years to negotiate terms for its relationship with the union, on issues like trade and migration.

What if Britain struck a series of deals that largely preserved the status quo, only without formal European Union membership?

This is how these kikes operate.

Are you going to let them do it?

Now is not the time for fear, Max Fisher. That comes later.

Tanstaffl
Age of Treason
January 3, 2014

ASA Members Vote To Endorse Academic Boycott of Israel, American Studies Association, 16 December 2013.

This statement, and especially the Endorsements attached below it, provide a good example of the jewish narrative blowing back on jews. The swift and explosive response from jews outside the ASA illustrates, yet again, that jews aren’t “white” in any meaningful political sense and their ethnostate isn’t subject to the usual standards by which “white” states are judged.

The divisively unanswerable questions of what it means to be ‘pro-Israel’, Max Fisher, 17 December 2013:

On Monday night, the heads of two major pro-Israel organizations and the editors of two publications associated with support for Israel gathered for a relatively routine event: a panel discussion at the 92nd Street Y, in New York, on “what it means to be pro-Israel.” A few hours earlier, members of the American Studies Association, an association of some 5,000 American studies college professors, had voted 2 to 1 to boycott Israeli universities. Shortly after the panel moderator and editor-in-chief of the Jewish Daily Forward, Jane Eisner, raised the issue, the panel broke up in a relatively spectacular walk-off.

In debates about Israel, disagreements that might seem minor on the surface – the “tyranny of small differences,” as one Israel-watcher put it to me – are often something much graver. If you know what to watch for, you can observe somber, serious people like these four panelists talk around underlying issues so sensitive they are rarely addressed or even acknowledged. Issues that are almost always below the surface, but too deep to come out except in moments of the most heated candor, often surprising even the people naming them.

These are questions so difficult, and that cut so close to the core of what it means to be an American supporter of Israel, that even scholars or professionals with decades invested in Israeli issues will hesitate to touch them. But you can hear them, if only hinted at, in arguments like Monday evening’s. Is it good or bad for Israel that more American Jews are questioning Israeli policies? At what point, if ever, should one’s support for Israel be limited by the needs of non-Israelis touched by the conflict? Is a Zionist’s responsibility to guard Israel’s survival, to guard Israel’s interests or merely to concern oneself dispassionately with the issues facing the country?

Some of these questions are simply unanswerable. Some are trick questions. Some are highly taboo; the question about competing interests can easily echo accusations, made by the most anti-Semitic movements in history, that Jews harbor “dual loyalties” and cannot be trusted. But many are just extremely difficult, touching on issues of identity, politics and personal responsibility. They cause conflict both because no one can agree on the answers, or often even the terms of the questions themselves, and because everyone ends up judging one another according to their own personal and widely varying standards.

What’s best for the jews? This is the central question around which jewish arguments about politics, identity and everything else revolve. To a jew this question is “unanswerable” only in the sense that they never stop asking it. By exaggerating their disagreements on answers jews downplay their agreement on the question.

In asking this question jews show no fear of tricks or taboos. What they fear are the wholly different questions which inevitably form in the minds of non-jews. Who are these jews? What are they doing? Why should anyone tolerate the conflict and harm they cause? These questions, and the “anti-semitic movements” which coallesce in response, have historically been instigated by the words and deeds of the jews themselves, by jewish parasitism, by jews infiltrating, manipulating and exploiting their host society.

In the case at hand the jews are more and more openly directing the resources of the United States toward Israel. They anticipate a hostile reaction because one is justified. The existence of Israel, their fruiting body, only highlights jewish parasitism. It inspires even nominally “liberal” jews to fret most illiberally over their particularist identity and interests, even when those interests are being served so clearly at the expense of others. It inspires even nominally “conservative” jews, like John Podhoretz, to tantrum at domestic tribemates on behalf of foreign tribemates.

How do they answer the ASA? By orchestrating political and academic boycotts, of course. Jews in government are moving to cut off government funds to ASA supporters and jews in universities are directing them to cut off support for ASA. No “dual loyalty” here. These jews in positions of power demonstrate that they see themselves as jews first, and see the institutions over which they have some measure of power as vehicles for advancing the interests of jews. One institution has vexed them, so they are using their influence over others to exact punishment.

Jews know they don’t face any substantial, organized opposition. The only real difficulty they have is in communicating about their conspiracy. Their problem is more cryptological than ideological. How to discuss and advance jewish interests while suppressing any “anti-semitic movement”? Their answer, as always, is to do both, because they are in essence the same.